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INTRODUCTION: A DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN
AMERICAN SOLDIER IN THE MIDDLE EAST'
A U.S. Army Infantry Company Commander, Danny Fernandez,
twenty-nine years old, finishes breakfast and gets ready to begin a
new day patrolling a large sector of Western Iraq with elements of
his company. He plans to meet and discuss issues of concern with the
tribal elders in four remote villages today. His mission is to maintain
security and stability within and around these villages so that
international relief agencies and non-governmental organizations
("NGOs") can help rebuild the lives and institutions of Iraq.
Over the past two months since Fernandez arrived in Iraq, he has
learned how the rural Iraqi society is organized, who are the leaders
with legitimacy that command respect from the citizens, and who are
the potential troublemakers. Fernandez has built solid relationships
with key village elders. He believes that he understands them pretty
well. He senses that his presence is seen as a necessary evil by most
Iraqis, who are very glad to see the end of Saddam Hussein's regime,
but do not want foreign troops occupying their nation.2 Many Iraqis
reluctantly recognize the need for U.S. troops to maintain order.
This particular morning, Fernandez feels very frustrated with the
continuing attacks against his soldiers. He tells Mr. Ibrahim, a tribal
elder with whom he has established a frank relationship, how he
wishes that the terrorists in Iraq that hurt his troops could all be
1. This is a fictional character and a fictional depiction of an encounter. It is
based on a compilation of individuals and events.
2. Interview with Paul Sullivan, Professor, Nat'l Def. Univ., in Wash., D.C.
(Apr. 25, 2004) ("Many Iraqis just want the Americans out now. Ayatollah Sistani
once told his followers, in the millions, that when they talk to the Americans to
thank them sincerely for getting rid of Saddam, but then ask them when they are
leaving.").
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rounded up, prosecuted and punished. He challenges Mr. Ibrahim to
use his influence to get villagers to turn over these terrorists to U.S.
authorities.
Mr. Ibrahim responds by saying that while he too wishes that the
fighting would stop, he believes that the people shooting at the
soldiers are not terrorists. He says that they are merely young Iraqi
boys fighting for liberation from foreign occupation. From their
perspective, says Mr. Ibrahim, the Qur'an mandates that Muslim
lands must be protected from occupation and oppression.
Fernandez angrily retorts that anybody resisting U.S. orders is a
terrorist and if the Qur'an tells them to fight Americans then the
Qur'an is full of "BS." Incensed, Mr. Ibrahim shouts at Fernandez
that he is no longer welcomed in his home or in the village.
Fernandez leaves the village convinced that Mr. Ibrahim is a terrorist
sympathizer and cannot be trusted.3
Did this fictional encounter have to end this way? Did it further
the objective of "winning the hearts and minds" of the Iraqi people?
Could Fernandez have expressed his feelings in a manner that would
have demonstrated a more sophisticated understanding of the
situation in Iraq? Perhaps if Fernandez had explained that the sooner
the violence ends, the sooner the Americans would leave, that would
have resonated with Mr. Ibrahim. He could also explain that the
fighters violate the law of war because they engage in acts of
violence against not just the American forces, but also Iraqi civilians,
women and children. These actions violate the law of war and
Islamic teachings that forbid the killing of women, children and old
men in combat: "From the earliest times it was forbidden (haram) to
kill noncombatants as well as women and children and monks and
rabbis, who were given the promise of immunity unless they had
taken part in the fighting."
4
3. Id. (explaining that beyond the specific issue of disagreement, the rift
created by this fictional exchange would cut deeper than Fernandez would
imagine). Mr. Ibrahim has lost a guest in his home and in Arab tribal terms he has
"lost face" by losing the guest, and also by allowing a guest to insult Islam in his
home. The loss of honor by Mr. Ibrahim would be very severe. Id.
4. JOHN L. ESPOSITO, UNHOLY WAR: TERROR IN THE NAME OF ISLAM 32
(2002).
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Such an exchange, while it might not convince Mr. Ibrahim to do
what Fernandez asked him to do, would probably not have led to the
break in relations with Fernandez as occurred in the original
scenario. If the stated goal of the U.S. military action in Iraq is to
liberate the people and help them establish a liberal democracy,5 then
dialog with the civilian leadership must be maintained. What can the
U.S. military do to prepare soldiers and commanders like Captain
Fernandez to better handle situations like the scenario described
above?
The thesis of this essay is that U.S. soldiers deployed to the
Middle East should receive education specifically addressing how
Muslims view the law of war and how to best use this knowledge
with respect to both friend and foe in the Middle East. In support of
this thesis, the essay will first define the nature of the deficiency in
the U.S. military education system with regards to this subject, and
its consequences. The essay next sets forth the three basic teaching
points relating to the law of war and Islam that should be taught to
U.S. soldiers in order to mitigate the previously identified deficiency.
The essay will conclude with a cursory suggestion for how the
proposed education can be implemented, along with an analysis of its
feasibility.
I. BACKGROUND: MIDDLE EAST, ISLAM,
AND THE LAW OF WAR
Before getting started with the thesis defense, it would be useful to
give a background and thus more precisely mark the scope of the
discussion. Three terms used in the thesis require fine-tuning: Middle
East, Islam, and law of war.
The region of the world described as the Middle East has no
precise agreed-upon boundaries. For purposes of this essay, however,
the term will include the geographic area that "runs from the Nile
5. Compare President's Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio,
38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1716 (Oct. 7, 2002) (describing Iraq as a security
threat, and declaring that Iraq must be confronted in order to preserve security and
win the war on terror), with President's Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY
COMp. PREs. Doc. 338 (Mar. 17, 2003) (noting that the United States' plan in Iraq
is to advance prosperity, liberty and peace).
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Valley to the Muslim lands of Central Asia, from extreme southeast
Europe to the Indian Ocean."6 The common threads within this
geographic space are not the ethnic or racial composition, language,
or cultural values. Rather, the characteristics that make it relevant to
the essay's thesis are the potential for turmoil and conflict, the
predominance of Islam, and the continuing or possible future U.S.
military deployments in the region. It is these common threads of
Islam, armed conflict and U.S. military presence that make this
region as defined particularly relevant to a discussion of Islam and
the law of war.
Along with Judaism and Christianity, Islam is one of the three
main monotheistic religions in the world, practiced by over a billion
people. Muslims worship Allah and revere the prophet Mohammad.7
"From Morocco across from Gibraltar on the Atlantic, eastward
across North Africa, through the Indian subcontinent (which includes
Pakistan and Bangladesh), on to the near-tip of Indonesia, Islam is a
vital force in the contemporary world."8 The worldwide Muslim
community, ummah, is extraordinarily diverse.9 The two major
groups of Muslims are Sunni and Shi'a.10 Sunni are the largest group,
6. ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT, JR., A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 7
(7th ed. 2002).
7. See AKBAR AHMED, DISCOVERING ISLAM: MAKING SENSE OF MUSLIM
HISTORY AND SOCIETY 17 (rev. ed. 2002) (explaining that Muhammad was born in
570 A.D. in the town of Makkah, the heart of the Arab tribal society). It is believed
that Muhammad became "the Prophet" of Islam when God revealed the Qur'an to
him and he was entrusted to spread God's message. Id. at 15.
8. S. A. NIGOSIAN, ISLAM: ITS HISTORY, TEACHING, AND PRACTICES xv
(Indiana University Press 2004) (1987); accord TIME ALMANAC 2005 359 (Borgna
Brunner et al. eds., 2005) (stating that there are 1.1 billion followers of Islam
internationally, which is approximately twenty percent of the world population,
second only to Christianity with 1.9 billion followers, and followed by Hinduism,
which has 781 million followers).
9. Cf NIGOSIAN, supra note 8, at xvi ("[T]he ummah, by its own Islamic
measure, is a privileged community, a community of shared identity and of unity,
in which cultural forms, societal patterns, and political realms all coalesce with
religious and devotional aspects.").
10. See id. at 44 (noting that the two major groups, Sunni and Shi'a, formed
over the conflict of who should ascend as the political leader after the death of
Muhammad). The Sunni faction insisted that the Prophet had not designated a
successor and thus they should elect one, while the Shi'a insisted that the Prophet
had designated his cousin and son-in-law Ali to succeed him. Id. at 18.
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making up more that eighty-five percent, and the Shi'a, who are
mostly concentrated in southern Iraq and Iran, are the second largest,
making up about ten percent of the Muslim population."I Within each
of these two major groups there exist many more sub-groups with
wide-ranging religious and political views. 12 Over seventy-five
percent of Muslims are not Arab. 3 It is also important to recognize
that the vast majority of Muslims do not live in theocracies ruled by
Islam. Rather, they live in nations with secular governments, 4 such
as Indonesia, 5  India,16  Bangladesh, 7
11. Id. at 44 ("In a modem context, the term Sunni indicates the traditional way
of the consolidated majority of the Islamic community as opposed to the [Shi'a]
partisan dissenters."). Shi'a is the official Islamic faith in Iran and Shi'a
communities also exist in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and in other countries
throughout the world. Id. at 49.
12. See id. at 46-49 (observing various groups that split apart from the Sunnis,
including the puritanical Wahhabis and the Ahmadiyyah movement who believe in
a second prophet, and subgroups of the Shi'as, including the Imamis, who embrace
the infallibility of the imam, and the Zaydi, who reject that the imam is
impeccable); cf TIME ALMANAC 2005, supra note 8, at 363 (affirming the
numerous fissures within the Islamic faith, but recalling the originally unifying
effect of Islam on the tribes of Arabia).
13. See NAGOSIAN, supra note 8, at xv (highlighting the fact that over three-
quarters of the world's total.Muslim population are located in non-Arab countries
such as the Philippines).
14. See generally WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2053
(1993) (defining "secular" as "of or relating to the state as distinguished from the
church" when describing courts or jurisdictions, and as "rationally organized
around impersonal and utilitarian values and patterns and receptive to new traits"
when describing a society).
15. See BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BACKGROUND NOTE: INDONESIA (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn/2748.htm (reporting that eighty-seven percent of the Republic of
Indonesia's 224 million citizens are Muslim and that Islam flourished in the
eastern archipelago during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries).
16. See BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BACKGROUND NOTE: INDIA (2004), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/3454.htm (stating that the predominantly Hindu federal republic has a Muslim
population of 126 million, which accounts for twelve percent of the country's total
population). Scholars do continue to debate the extent of India's "secularism"
because of discriminatory treatment of different religions under its Constitution in
the area of family law. See Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory
and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 759, 763 n.3 (2004).
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Egypt, 8 Iraq,' 9 Turkey,20 and Syria,21 to name the most populous
nations. 2
Finally, we must establish a common understanding for the term
"law of war." This term will be used in this essay to mean the rules
governing the conduct of forces during war, specifically, the
application of force during war-jus in bello.23 The law of war
emanates from numerous sources and is often referred to as
"international humanitarian law" within the international legal
17. See Bangladesh: Protecting the Human Rights of Thought, Conscience, and
Religion: Hearings Before the U.S. Comm 'n on Int'l Religious Freedom (opening
remarks, Congressman Joseph Crowley, Chair, Cong. Caucus on Bangladesh)
(2004), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/events/hearings/2004/april/04302004
oRemarkscrowley.html (noting that Bangladesh has been historically known as a
"moderate Muslim country with a secular democratic government").
18. See Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of
Egypt, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1045-48 (2004) (recounting Egypt's
move to secular law in the latter half of the nineteenth century, with the notable
exception of family law); see also Nathan J. Brown & Clark B. Lombardi, Do
Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari'a Threaten Human Rights? How
Egypt's Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law,
21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2006).
19. See Ash U. Bali, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of Law and the Ethics of
Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431, 450 (2005) (asserting that the
United States is committed to maintaining Iraq as a secular state).
20. See Maximilien Turner, Comment, The Price of a Scarf: The Economics of
Strict Secularism, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 321, 324-28 (2005) (reviewing the
break between "Islam and the state" following the popular uprising in Turkey at
the end of World War I).
21. See BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BACKGROUND NOTE: SYRIA (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm (stating that the leading political party in Syria, the Arab
Ba'ath Socialist party, embraces secularism). Although the Syrian Constitution
does not make Islam the state religion, the President must be Muslim and religious
courts have jurisdiction over issues of personal and family law. Id.
22. See generally FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF
POLITICAL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES 725-26 (Aili Piano & Arch Puddington eds.,
2004).
23. This paper does not include within the term "law of war" the legal
principles that govern the justification for the start of armed conflict-jus ad
bellum. Following World War II, these principles are primarily found in the UN
Charter.
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community. 4 Important sources for the law of war include: The Law
of the Hague, which limits the methods and means of warfare; 25 the
Laws of Geneva, which protect "victims" of war, such as sick and
wounded, prisoners of war, and civilians.26 and several specific
treaties governing protection of cultural property,27 biological
weapons, 28  gas weapons, 29  and conventional
24. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW? (2004) (stating that international humanitarian law, also
called "law of war" or "law of armed conflict," aims to limit armed conflict's
negative effects, protect people who are not participating in hostilities, and restrict
warfare methods). See generally Eric A. Posner, A Theory of the Laws of War, 70
U. CHI. L. REv. 297 (2003) (providing historical context, theory and analysis of
laws of war).
25. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18,
1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631; Convention with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429
(prohibiting the use of poisons, killing treacherously, killing a person who has laid
down his arms, causing superfluous injury, improperly using an enemy's flag or
needlessly destroying an enemy's property during war).
26. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Protocol I] (providing rules of war, such as medical transportation
during war, methods and means of warfare combat and prisoners of war, treatment
of civilian populations, zones under special protection, civil defense, measures for
women and children, and protection for journalists); Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609 (outlining rules of war, including humane treatment for individuals such as
children and detainees, care for wounded, sick and shipwrecked, protections for
civilian populations, and cultural objects and other measures).
27. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 (defining cultural property and
outlining protections for cultural property during war, including transportation
measures and immunity from seizure for certain cultural property items).
28. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (stating that all
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weapons.3" In addition to treaties, unwritten customary law also
forms the basis for the law of war.3 The term "law of war" does not
refer to interpretations of religious principles that are not generally
recognized by the international community. Thus, for purposes of
this essay, the term "law of war" does not include edicts or tenants
contained in the Qur'an, Islamic teachings, or any religious source,
unless also found in secular sources of the law.32
II. DEFICIENCIES IN THE CURRENT MILITARY
EDUCATION PROGRAM CONCERNING THE
IMPACT OF ISLAM ON THE LAW OF WAR AND
ITS CONSEQUENCES
American soldiers receive excellent combat and professional
training at all levels. The U.S. Army provides extraordinarily
signed parties agree never to produce or retain biological agents or other toxins
that have no use for peaceful purposes, or any equipment designed to facilitate use
of such toxins in conflict).
29. See, e.g., Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17,
1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (prohibiting the use of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, and the use of all analogous liquids, materials or devices
in warfare); see also Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for
signature Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 (providing
guidelines for chemical weapons and facilities used to produce chemical weapons,
including obligations to report possession of chemical weapons and establish plans
for their destruction).
30. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to
Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 (stating that the
parties agree not to use weapons or projectiles in a way that causes superfluous
injury, unnecessary suffering, or severe damage to the environment, and noting
that the parties wish to restrict use, stockpiling, and production of conventional
weapons in order to facilitate disarmament).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102 (1987).
32. It should also be noted that many Muslims in tribal cultures like Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan (and parts of Iraq) would default to their
particular tribal rules for conflict, rather than Islamic law. But this essay's thesis is
about teaching the U.S. soldiers about the "impact" of Islam on the law of war. To
keep the issue in focus, the essay will thus use the term "law of war" to refer to the
internationally recognized definition as described in the essay.
2005]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
realistic training at the Joint Readiness Training Center ("JRTC")
that replicates the problems and challenges soldiers are likely to face
while deployed to Middle Eastern nations. U.S. soldiers and marines
also receive excellent instruction concerning the customs of Islamic
people,33 although on an ad hoc basis. Yet, for all of this, top-notch
training specifically tailored to scenarios based on Middle Eastern
operations, why are American soldiers, like Captain Fernandez in the
story above, not better prepared to exchange ideas with Muslims
such as Mr. Ibrahim, concerning the interrelationships between
terrorists, the law of war, and Islam?
Unfortunately, the U.S. military currently has no formal education
program for the benefit of its troops specifically concerning this
particular subject. The rudimentary instruction some receive during
their military careers concerning the law of war does not address the
impact of Islam on the law of war. Thus, many U.S. soldiers make
assumptions that Islamic countries reject the law of war because they
believe this law is based on Christian principles. They also believe
that violent puritanical Islamic organizations act without any regard
for the law of war by targeting innocent civilians.
As reinforcement to these assumptions, U.S. soldiers have been
told that the United States is engaged in a global war against
terrorism.34 Thus they might reasonably assume those Muslim
enemies that they fight-regardless of the enemy's ultimate goals,
the weapons they use or the ways in which they use their weapons-
should be labeled as "terrorists." This analysis does not require
thought from the U.S. soldier to conclude that an individual enemy
33. See Bill Kaczor, Marine Leader: Civilian Agencies Should Be Involved in
War Plans, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Oct. 20, 2004, at B7 (stating that in 2003
the military trained 800 marines in four-week sessions on Arabic language and
culture, and Islam); see also Press Release, Darlene Goodwin, Chief of Naval
Educ. and Training, CNET Hosts Cultural Training Team (May 14, 2002),
available at https://www.cnet.navy.mil/cnet/pao/pr2002/02-042.pdf (describing a
military seminar on understanding Islamic and Arab cultures to increase cultural
awareness among military members).
34. See President's Address to the Nation on the War on Terror from Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1079 (July 1, 2005),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2005-
presidential documents&docid=pd04jy05_txt-8 (stating that U.S. troops are
fighting a war on terror and that Iraq is its battlefield).
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combatant, in a particular case, should be classified as a terrorist; a
conclusion which carries legal and practical implications. In this
uncluttered view of the battle space, everyone is either a terrorist or
not a terrorist.
Unfortunately, the real landscape where actual and potential
enemies of the United States operate in the Middle East is extremely
complicated, multifaceted, and ever changing.35  Additionally,
coalition partners of the United States, as well as NGOs, also possess
widely differing views about the parameters of permissible conduct
during armed conflict.36 If U.S. forces view the landscape through an
absolutely pure black and white lens and see only terrorists and non-
terrorists, they may miss opportunities to build relationships as was
depicted in the opening fictional story with Captain Fernandez.
Muslims that do not actively support terrorist strategies, but might
support the political objectives of those committing violent acts, do
not necessarily have to be branded as terrorists. Painting all who
share a common objective with the same broad brush as a 'terrorist'
might lead U.S. military leaders to unnecessarily dismiss meaningful
discussion with civic leaders or worse, antagonize them to the point
where they might begin to actively support the terrorists.
While it is not the goal of this essay to create a program that would
produce experts on Islam and the law of war, U.S. commanders must
understand the perspectives of their audiences in order to
successfully argue the legitimacy of U.S. military actions to Islamic
civic leaders, coalition partners, and the media. A lack of meaningful
discussion will foster negative repercussions. First, within the nation
where the United States is trying to bring peace, stability and a
liberal democracy, inaccurate assumptions about how Islam relates to
35. See The Middle East: Stentorian Guard, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 2005, at 12
(noting that the Middle East is a complex mixture of conflicts and alliances,
including strains of nationalism and religious fundamentalism, that the region has a
long history of turbulence, and that theories of international relations in the Middle
East cannot be placed into neat categories).
36. See, e.g., LAW. COMM. FOR HUM. RTs., ASSESSING THE NEW NORMAL:
LIBERTY AND SECURITY FOR THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 UNITED STATES 51-61
(2003), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/descriptions/
Assessing/Ch4.pdf (reviewing interpretive differences among the United States,
Sweden, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Australia, England, Wales and Canada on the
application of Geneva Convention provisions to detainees at Guantanamo).
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the law of war makes it harder to anticipate the enemy's next move.
Further, the inability to explain to the local people why the actions of
the violent fundamentalist Islamists violate the law of war and
Islamic tenants will make it harder to establish legitimacy for U.S.
military actions.37
Additionally, U.S. forces in Iraq need to cooperate on security
measures with local Islamic military forces, coalition partners, and
NGOs to accomplish the nation-building mission. An educated
understanding of Islam and the law of war by U.S. commanders is
vital for establishing effective cooperation with these groups
concerning security measures. Finally, on the international stage,
U.S. commanders that hold inaccurate assumptions about how Islam
relates to the law of war are likely to pose a greater risk of projecting
a negative public image to the world when trying to explain U.S.
military actions.
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. military does provide its forces
with some training that focuses on Islam. However, these laudatory
efforts do not address the very specific and difficult issue at the core
of our armed actions in Islamic nations. U.S. forces conduct military
operations in accordance with the law of war.38 Most Islamic nations,
while legally obligated to follow the same law as the rest of the
world, interpret the requirements of the law from their unique
perspective. Thus, our Islamic partners may have a different view
from the United States view of what the principles of proportionality,
unnecessary suffering and collateral damage mean under the law of
war. Our current training does not provide this insight into the
37. While Muslims would grant much more credence to an explanation
justifying U.S. military actions if it came from learned Islamic clerics or people
known in their community to be pious and knowledgeable, the initial explanation
must come from the U.S. commanders. The explanation must be presented in a
manner that will resonate with the Muslim audience.
38. See U.S. Dep't of Def., Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program
(1998); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 5810.01, Implementation
of the DoD Law of War Program (1996); Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Instruction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces (2000)
("U.S. forces will always comply with the Law of Armed Conflict."). Except when
properly determined by the National Command Authority that it is not applicable,
DoD Components "will comply with the Law of War in the conduct of all military
operations and related activities in armed conflict, however such conflicts are
characterized ..... U.S. Dep't of Def., supra.
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perspectives of our Islamic partner nations, let alone insight into the
views of terrorists, who select passages from the Qur'an and
supplemental religious doctrine and use them out of context to
support their clearly illegal acts.
In short, U.S. commanders must be prepared to:
* Find common ground with our Islamic partner armed
forces on the application of the law of war;
* Wage an intelligent information campaign against the
terrorists;
* Discuss cooperative security measures with NGOs that
require or request such measures; and
" Explain the legitimacy behind U.S. military actions to
Islamic civic leaders and the media.
III. THREE SUBSTANTIVE TEACHING POINTS
There are three fundamental teaching points concerning Islam and
the law of war that each U.S. military leader at Company Command
and above should understand in order to help him or her accomplish
missions. Before a U.S. commander can understand the impact of
Islam on the law of war, he or she must understand the most basic
characteristics of Islam, as well as Islamic teachings concerning the
law of war and the proper usage of the term terrorist.
First, as previously noted, the followers of Islam are diverse and
complex. Followers of Islam, including those living in the Middle
East, represent a countless array of ethnic and religious factions.
Multiple religious and political divisions among Islamic people have
been a historical fact from the very beginning of the Islamic faith.3 9
Every state in the Middle East, and every group of people within
each state, interpret and apply their own unique view of Islamic
39. See IGNAZ GOLDZIHER, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC THEOLOGY AND LAW
168 (Andras Hamori & Ruth Hamori trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1981) (1910)
(clarifying that sects within the Islamic religion are only considered to be those
groups who depart from the sunna, the historically endorsed form of Islam, on
fundamental issues). Such divisions, or sects, within Islam go back to its earliest
age and are still in effect today. Id.
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teachings in their lives.4" In terms of Islamic law or jurisprudence,
there is not one, nor even two (Sunni and Shi'a) interpretations, but
countless complex variations.4'
Second, Islam teaches restrictions on the conduct of war. The
Qur'an itself and other Islamic teachings have always placed limits
on the death and destruction caused by war to varying degrees,
dependirig on the historical period and the Islamic factions involved
in the conflict.42 In modem times, Islamic nations have made
significant contributions to the development of the law of war and
every Islamic nation is a party to the key law of war treaties. 43
Third, the American military must use the terrorism label
accurately. It is not necessarily the stated objectives of
fundamentalist Islamic groups that earn them the label of terrorist.44
40. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1015,
1017 (1991) (describing Islam as a "decentralized" religion and explaining how
Islam is subject to varying interpretations due to the lack of a recognized central
authority on doctrinal matters).
41. See Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic
Law, 14 Wis. INT'L L.J. 349, 367-68 (1996) (listing the major schools of
jurisprudence within the Sunnis as being the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki and Hanbali,
and within the Shi'a sect as including "the Ithna 'Ashari or Imamis, Ismaili, Alawi,
Druze, and Zeydi").
42. See MAJID KADDURI, THE ISLAMIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTICE 164-73 (1984)
(acknowledging the justification for warfare in the Qu'ran as the jihad, and
detailing how the interpretation of the concept has evolved over time from waging
war against non-believers in conflict with Islam, toward modem day secular wars
motivated for reasons beyond the duty ofjihad).
43. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, STATES PARTY TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (2005), available at
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/party-gc (listing nations that are
party to the Geneva Conventions, including many countries with large Muslim
populations).
44. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2000) (defining "international terrorism"
as "activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State," and that appear
to be intended "to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to influence the policy
of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to affect the conduct of a
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping"). There is a lack of
consensus on the definition of terrorism, which can lead to politically motivated
abuse. See Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International
Community's Quest for Identifying the Specter of Terrorism, 36 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 491, 491-93 (2004).
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Rather, the violent methods used by these groups make their actions
illegitimate and illegal. The possibly legitimate ends do not justify
the illegal methods used. Terrorists intentionally target innocent
civilians and non-combatants, endanger civilians by trying to blend
in with them, torture and summarily execute opponents, and violate
numerous other clear provisions of the law of war.
We shall now explore in greater depth these three teaching points
that could serve as the nucleus of the new and enhanced program of
instruction for U.S. soldiers, commanders, and other military
specialists. As will be discussed below, the particulars concerning
the depth and breath of the instruction for each teaching point should
depend on the student's anticipated responsibilities while deployed to
the Middle East. Further, the instruction should be tailored, as much
as possible, to the particular region within the Middle East where the
soldier is expected to deploy. The concept, however, is that these
three teaching points can form the cornerstone of the instruction that
would support additions and modifications as required. They
represent the substantive information of what needs to be taught. The
last section of the essay will answer the questions of who, when,
where and how the instruction could take place.
A. ISLAM IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS VERY DIVERSE,
COMPLEX, AND ALWAYS EVOLVING
"From its beginnings the faith, unity, and very survival of the
Islamic community were threatened by civil war, sectarianism,
violence, assassination of its leaders, and terrorism. "'
During the life of the Prophet Mohammed, religion, politics and
war blended together as the Prophet used his followers as a force to
make Allah's plan for social justice a reality on earth. Immediately
upon the Prophet's death in 632 A.D., however, "deep divisions and
conflicts revolving around leadership and authority" of the Islamic
community erupted and continue to operate to this day.46 The most
fundamental split involved the issue of succession when the Prophet
45. ESPOSITO, supra note 4, at 36.
46. Id.
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died.47 At the risk of oversimplification, today's Sunni sect,
comprising over eighty-five percent of the world-wide Muslim
population,48 supported a succession process for the leadership of the
Muslim community that selected the most pious Muslim as the
political leader--caliph--of their community.4 9 The term Sunni
means follower of the example of the Prophet.5 0 Shi'as, on the other
hand, supported a hereditary line of succession that would have
resulted in the senior male in the Prophet's family being chosen as
their leader.5' This fundamental split over the question of political
leadership of the community "set in motion a sequence of events that
led to division, rebellion, and historic conflict. 5 2 Over the following
years, decades and centuries, many more violent and bloody splits
within each major sect of Sunni and Shi'a have occurred.53
Although all Muslims share a fundamental belief at the core of
their religion, commonly referred to as the five pillars of Islam,54 it is
important to consider that the fundamental belief operates as an
obligatory floor, "thus only part of a much larger reality."55 At one
end of the incredibly wide spectrum that is Islam are the Wahhabi
and Salafi movements. "Although originally associated with Saudi
Arabia, Wahhabi Islam... has come to be used popularly, although
47. See id. at 37 (articulating that the issue of succession after Muhammad's
death was the basis for the creation and division of Shi'a and Sunni Islam).
48. See NIGOSIAN, supra note 8, at 7.
49. See ESPOSITO, supra note 4, at 37 (relating that the successor, Abu Bakr,
was the well-respected father-in-law of Muhammad).
50. See id. (explaining that those who accepted the choice of Abu Bakr,
Muhammad's father-in-law, became known as Sunnis, followers of the Sunnah or
example of the Prophet).
51. See id. (reviewing how the Shi'a believed Muhammad chose his own
successor, Ali, the senior male in his family).
52. Id.
53. See generally MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 181-226 (1984)
(tracing the history of the divisions within Islam from Muhammad's death to the
early twentieth century).
54. See GOLDZIHER, supra note 39, at 13-14 (listing the pillars as: 1) profession
of faith that there is only one God and that Muhammad is the Messenger of God;
2) ritual of the prayer service; 3) almsgiving; 4) fasting; and 5) pilgrimage to
Mecca).
55. JoHN RENARD, RESPONSES TO 101 QUESTIONS ON ISLAM 33 (1998).
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inaccurately, as a blanket term for Islamic fundamentalism, religious
extremism, and radicalism."56 A more accurate term to describe this
extremist ideology is Salafiyyah. The Salafi Muslims claim to
believe in a pure and original form of Islam. Both terms, Wahhabi
and Salafi, when used to describe Muslims "can be misleading, as
they are used as umbrella terms that incorporate diverse ideologies
and movements, medieval and modem, nonviolent and violent."57
At the other end of the spectrum are the Muslims that believe in
secular governments and keep religion and state separate. 8 As
mentioned earlier, the vast majority of Muslims live in nations with
secular governments.5 9 The important teaching point to remember is
that people often use shorthand labels to describe the beliefs of
others (e.g., Sunnis, Shi'a, Salafi and Wahhabi) when in fact the
reality of a group's beliefs is more complex than the easy label
would make it appear. In the case of the Middle East, U.S.
commanders should understand the reality of the deep religious,
political and social complexities within the region, avoid making
generalizations and always keep an open mind to different points of
view.
B. ISLAM TEACHES RESTRICTIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF WAR
"Do not cheat or commit treachery, nor should you mutilate
or kill children, women, or old men. ,60
The second teaching point is that Islamic culture, like many other
cultures, has attempted to place limits on the death and destruction
caused by war. The Qur'an contains several passages that restrict the
56. ESPOSITO, supra note 4, at 105-06.
57. Id. at 106.
58. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, State Responsibilities in Combating Trafficking in
Persons in Central Asia, 27 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 145, 162 (2005)
(identifying Central Asian countries, where Islam is the majority religion, that
promote a secular style of Islam in an attempt to avoid Islamic fundamentalism in
government).
59. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
60. JoHN KELSAY, ISLAM AND WAR: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE ETHICs 60
(1993) (quoting the hadith, as interpreted by al-Shaybani in the ninth century, and
attributing limitations on the use of force to the Prophet Muhammad).
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use of force.6' As early as the ninth century, Islamic religious-legal
scholars, or fuqaha, wrote opinions that laid foundations for the
development of rules for war in accordance with Islam.62 These rules
"reflect[ed] a cultural consensus on the conduct of war: a consensus
that owe[d] much to moral principles and theological concerns but
[was] also indebted to political and military factors."63 With an
expanding empire, Muslims needed military force to conquer new
lands and to defend their territory. Rules governing combat by
Muslim forces became necessary to maintain order and discipline
within the ranks.
An important difference in the approach between classic Islam and
the modern law of war is simplified as follows. Classic Islam based
protections primarily on the person's religious beliefs .(i.e., whether
the person is a believer or not).64 The modern law of war bases
protection on the person's status (i.e., whether the person is a
combatant or not). Classic Islam considered believers of Islam as
"innocent;" unbelievers were "guilty. '6 Jews and Christians, as
"people of the Book," (believers in the one true God) enjoyed certain
protected status, but not to the same degree as Muslims. 66 Absolute
non-believers (those not of the Book) could be killed even after
surrender; Muslims who abandoned the fight or surrendered should
be spared.
61. See Laura A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism:
Detentions, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1489-90 (2002) ("And fight in God's cause against those
who wage war against you, but do not transgress limits, for God loves not the
transgressors." (quoting Qur'an 2:190)).
62. See KELSAY, supra note 60, at 59 (pointing to the treatise Kitab al-Siyar, or
the book of conduct, written by al-Shaybani on international relations).
63. Id.
64. See HILMI M. ZAWATI, IS JIHAD A JUST WAR? WAR, PEACE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS UNDER ISLAMIC AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (2001) (stating that
war could not begin without first asking the enemy to adopt Islam).
65. See RUTHVEN, supra note 53, at 128-29 (describing that the word kafir,
meaning unbelievers, originated to describe those ungrateful for the truths revealed
in the Qur'an and became synonymous with sinner by breakaway sects of Islam).
66. See ZAWATI, supra note 64, at 38 (quoting passage 29:46 of the Qur'an as
advocating non-violence against the People of the Book unless they first commit
an aggression).
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This evolution of classic Islam was by no means universally
accepted.67 Some Muslims adhered to the tradition of the Prophet
Muhammad's example of clemency to the people of Mecca upon his
return after the hijra to claim Mecca for the Muslims.68 Nobody was
harmed; no blood was shed.69 Even under classic Islam absolute non-
believers received some protection. 70 For example, women, children
and old men should be spared, but could be taken as slaves and their
property confiscated.7' In sum, despite the difference in the two
approaches, Westerners and Muslims equally recognized the need to
restrict unnecessary death and destruction in war.72
Regardless of the early Islamic views concerning the rules for the
conduct of war, Islamic states eventually played a "highly significant
[role] in both the internationalization and humanization of the
European law of war,"73 shifting the basis away from Christian
theology to natural law and humanist principles. During recent wars
some Islamic states have complied with certain principles of the law
of war.
By the mid-nineteenth century, as the Western world began to
codify the customary rules of combat,74 the Ottoman and Persian
Empires began to argue for due consideration and accommodation of
67. See ESPOSITO, supra note 4, at 41-42 (stating how the Kharajites were
among the first to become extremist by advocating strict militant rules and those
who would not follow them were enemies of God and punishable by death).
68. See ZAWATI, supra note 64, at 44 n.212 (recounting Muhammad's mercy to
the Meccans after his conquest in 630 A.D.).
69. See id. (noting that eight years later, the second Caliph conquered
Jerusalem without bloodshed for the first time in history).
70. See KELSAY, supra note 60, at 59 (interpreting sayings attributed to
Muhammad as forbidding the killing of children even if they are nonbelievers).
71. See id. at 60, 62 (suggesting that Islamic ideas of the rules of warfare
blended religious, moral, political, and military factors).
72. See ZAWATI, supra note 64, at 41-45 (comparing and contrasting the
limitations on warfare in "Islamic international law" with the Geneva and Hague
Conventions).
73. James Cockayne, Islam and International Humanitarian Law: From a
Clash to a Conversation Between Civilizations, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 597,
599 (2002).
74. See id. at 601-02 (referring to the Geneva Conference in 1863, the Geneva
Convention in 1864, and the Brussels Conference in 1874).
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their issues. The influence of Islam on this process was significant; it
served "as an 'other' against which the law [of war] could define
itself. ...[E]ncounters with Islam ...forced the law to adopt a
secular modernism which transcended" the law's Christian origins.75
In short, during the second half of the nineteenth century, Muslims
objected to the use of the Red Cross as a protected symbol for
providing humanitarian aid during combat, arguing that it
represented Christianity. After years of debate, in 1906 the Geneva
Revision Conference officially declared that the Red Cross was not a
religious symbol7 6 and in 1929 officially recognized the Red
Crescent as a protected symbol. 77 This principle of religious non-
discrimination is one of the cornerstones of the law of war.
Today, as mentioned previously, all Islamic states are parties to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and many other treaties that
collectively comprise the law of war. Obviously, the fact that a state
has accepted a legally binding obligation to adhere to the
requirements of the law of war does not mean that it will comply
with said requirements in practice .7 The historical record reflects,
however, that the Arab nations that fought against Israel in 1967 and
1973 largely complied with the law of war. 79 They used appropriate
symbols to mark weapons and equipment, prisoners of war
75. Id. at 607.
76. See id. at 609 (recognizing the red cross was an inversion of the Swiss flag,
another symbol of neutrality).
77. See id. at 610 (concluding that the recognition of the red crescent,
representing Turkey and Egypt, and the red sun and lion, representing Persia, in
Article 19 of the Geneva Convention of 1929, was a result of the increased number
of Islamic states participating in international conferences).
78. Furthermore, as with all international obligations (and domestic, for that
matter), interpretive distinctions among states provide another avenue for
compliance variations. See, e.g., Louis-Philippe F. Rouillard, Misinterpreting the
Prohibition of Torture Under International Law: The Office of Legal Counsel
Memorandum, 21 AM. U. INT'L L., REv. 9 (2005) (reviewing different
interpretations of conduct constituting torture).
79. See Interview with French Maclean, Professor, Nat'l Def. Univ., in Wash.,
D.C. (Dec. 1, 2003) ("[I]n both the 1967 and 1974 Arab-Israeli wars-the former
initiated by Egypt, the latter by Israel-Arab forces appear to have generally
followed the law of war.").
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("POWs") were generally treated properly, and non-combatants were
not intentionally targeted. 80
Even during the long and brutal Iraq-Iran War during the 1980s,
both sides selectively followed portions of the law of war.
Interestingly, the fundamentalist Islamic regime that ruled Iran at that
time interpreted and applied the law of war from a classic Islamic
Shi'a perspective. For example, Iraqi POWs who rejected Saddam
Hussein were viewed as "believers" in Islam and were treated
preferentially as compared to the POWs who did not reject Saddam
Hussein.81 The Iranians viewed the entire conflict as a defense of
Islam against the satanic non-believer, Saddam Hussein. This
apparent tendency to revive a classic or fundamentalist approach to
the law of war has not been limited to Iran, as described below.
C. USE THE TERRORISM LABEL ACCURATELY
"Terrorism-The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of
unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals
that are generally political, religious, or ideological. " 82
U.S. commanders should be very precise when applying the
terrorist label to an enemy because the term is obviously pejorative
and implies certain legal and practical consequences. Terror is a
strategy often chosen by an adversary when conventional, legal
methods of armed conflict are not feasible. It is the illegal nature of
the act, as defined by the recognized international law of war, with
the intent to cause fear among the civilian population that earns the
people who perpetrate the act the label of terrorist. People will
sometimes focus on the ultimate stated objectives of the groups
committing terrorist acts and if they agree with the objectives--often
freedom for some oppressed people-they might conclude that these
80. Id.
81. See KELSAY, supra note 60, at 75 (mentioning that the U.N. Security
Council held such treatment to be "ideological abuse" of the prisoners and led to
rioting within the prison camps).
82. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS
538 (2001) (as amended through Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jplO2.pdf.
2005]
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
people are not terrorists, but rather "freedom fighters." U.S.
commanders must be able to debate that while a particular political
objective may have legitimacy, illegal violent acts intended to
achieve the political objective are nevertheless unjustified war crimes
against civilians. The legitimacy and fairness of the terrorists' stated
objectives do not excuse or justify illegal acts.
To further complicate matters, not all terrorists espouse the same
view concerning the rules for the conduct of armed conflict. The
abundant number of terrorist organizations holding a wide range of
views relating to the conduct of war makes it difficult to generalize
about these groups. For example, Shi'a Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
condemned the car bombings that killed over sixty-eight Iraqis in
Basra on April 23, 2004; however, during the same sermon he
threatened that an army of suicide bombers will protect him from
being taken into custody by U.S. forces. 83 Further, even when groups
profess adherence to the law of war, it is often impossible to tell if
such groups act in accordance with their public pronouncements.
Perhaps these terrorist groups only think about the law of war not in
terms of how to comply with it, but in terms of how to publicly
justify their illegal actions as falling within the framework of the law
of war. Of course, there are some terrorists who are completely
unburdened with even trying to appear legitimate and justified in
their actions.
Some violent groups are not really Islamic, but because they are in
the Middle East some Americans label them as such. One of the
earliest Arab terrorist groups, the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO"), was not a fundamentalist or puritanical Islamic
organization. On the contrary, it espoused the nationalist goal of
establishing a Palestinian state.' Even so, it played a significant role
83. See Iraqis Arrest 5 in Connection with Basra Bombings, CNN, Apr. 23,
2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/23/iraq.main/index.html
(detailing the message delivered by al-Sadr in which he threatened suicide attacks
if U.S. forces conduct military operations in Karbala and Najaf while condemning
and denying involvement in that week's deadly terror attacks in Basra and
Riyadh).
84. See BARRY RuBnN, REVOLUTION UNTIL VICTORY? THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF THE PLO 1 (1994) (detailing the May 1964 meeting where four
hundred Palestinian delegates convened to form the PLO whose ethnic and
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in the development of the law of war by promoting Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. 5 This Protocol extended the protection of
combatant status to insurgents in these wars of liberation. Some
groups claim that they pursue a purely "defensive" armed struggle to
"throw off' (intifada) what they view as the unjust Israeli oppressors.
While once synonymous with terrorism, the PLO eventually gained
legitimacy on the world stage, earning its leader, Yassir Arafat,
multiple visits to the White House.
When certain groups publicly espouse adherence to the law of war
the obvious question becomes how can they reconcile their professed
adherence to the law of war with a suicide bomber that intentionally
targets and kills civilians? Some groups, like the PLO, generally
voice rejection, and sometimes condemnation, for this kind of tactic.
Obviously, what the PLO says in public and what it does behind the
scenes in support of such illegal tactics may differ.8 6 Other violent
Islamic non-state organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, seem
to be reverting to a more classic Islamic interpretation of the law of
war. They view the civilians of occupying nations as legitimate
targets for attack, not based on their conduct on the battlefield, or
status as combatants, but rather because they are non-believers that
support the unjust occupation and thus bear collective guilt for the
transgressions of their government. This trend towards the classic
Islamic view of the law of war by Islamic militants appears to be a
continuation of the trend begun in Iran during the Iraq-Iran War, and
nationalistic purpose would be to replace the Jewish state of Israel with the Arab
state of Palestine).
85. See Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify
Geneva Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 678 (1995) (noting that President
Regan did not recommend ratification of Protocol I because of underlying
concerns that it would legitimize PLO claims concerning POW privileges); see
also Protocol I, supra note 26.
86. See Russell Korobkin & Jonathan Zasloff, Roadblocks to the Road Map: A
Negotiation Theory Perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict After Yasser
Arafat, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28 (2005) (noting that while the international
community recognizes the Palestinian Authority as the legitimate voice of
Palestine, it remains to be seen whether the Palestinian Authority would be able to
prevent terrorist acts by groups such as Hamas who still follow the historic mission
of the PLO).
2005] 213
AM. U. INT'L L. RE V.
is consistent with the broader trend towards fundamentalist Islamic
values in general within parts of today's Islamic world. 7
The important point is that many of these groups seem compelled
to publicly either embrace the law of war or a classic Islamic law, no
matter how perverse of a spin they put on their actions in order to
claim legitimacy. The conduct of some of these groups (i.e., the
obviously unlawful use of violence) combined with the intent to
cause fear among the public, not their ultimate objectives, is what
rightfully earns them the label of "terrorists." The U.S. commander
must be able to articulate this important point to Muslim citizens,
Islamic coalition partners and the media.
IV. THE PROPOSED TRAINING PROGRAM
What can be done to fix this deficiency in training and impart the
three teaching points to U.S. soldiers, commanders and specialists?
The Department of Defense ("DoD") Law of War Program already
mandates that all U.S. military personnel will receive appropriate law
of war training." The DoD could amend this program to require each
service to implement additional training concerning Islamic views of
the law of war, depending on the individual student's circumstance,
such as their level of responsibility and anticipated type of
assignment when deployed to the Middle East. Special commissions
composed of a wide range of experts from varied points of view
could be convened to recommend and develop the details for these
new training programs. The actual programs that would be
implemented by each military service would likely vary, but they
should seek a uniform message centered on the three basic teaching
points discussed above. This essay has already addressed the
questions of why this education is necessary and what the basic
87. See Bernard K. Freamon, Martyrdom, Suicide, and the Islamic Law of War:
A Short Legal History, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 299, 300 (2003) (noting that the
classic Islamic view requires that when non-Muslim groups seriously threaten an
Islamic community, they are allowed to go to war to defend themselves).
88. U.S. Dep't of Def., supra note 38, § 4.
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teaching points of the education should be. It will now suggest a
model program that answers the remaining questions.
A. WHO TEACHES THE PROPOSED EDUCATION?
The DoD Law of War Program places the burden of teaching
every soldier, marine, sailor and airman about the law of war on the
commanders. The Judge Advocates of each service, as the military's
experts on matters concerning law, including international law, are
charged with implementing the DoD Law of War program on behalf
of the commanders. Over the course of more than a quarter of a
century, Judge Advocates in all services have fulfilled this
responsibility admirably. Today, in light of the intense operational
tempo of the military and the current state of war confronting the
nation and armed forces, the task of the Judge Advocates to teach
about the law of war grows only more important. Thus, the Judge
Advocates, properly prepared to teach about the three basic teaching
points concerning Islam and the law of war, would be the best
resource within each service to perform this new duty. The Judge
Advocate is best equipped and legally trained to incorporate this
new, complex and nuanced subject matter into the existing law of
war curriculum. This would require that Judge Advocates receive
sufficient education themselves to enable them to professionally
teach the subject.
B. WHO SHOULD RECEIVE THE TRAINING?
The existing DoD Law of War Program requires that all members
of the armed forces receive general training about the application of
the Geneva Conventions and other law of war treaties. The proposed
additional training, however, could be limited to those soldiers and
marines realistically expected to deploy to the Middle East at some
point in the near future. The students could be categorized into
different levels depending on their anticipated responsibilities while
deployed to the Middle East. Thus, the breadth and depth of the
instruction could be tailored to the category of the student. For each
level, an increasingly more ambitious degree of sophistication would
be the goal. For example, Level I could apply to the enlisted soldier
or marine with the objective of achieving a fundamental
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understanding of the subject. These soldiers should be expected to
understand the basics of the subject.
Company, battalion and brigade commanders could be placed into
Level II, requiring a more sophisticated understanding of the subject.
They should be able to not only understand the subject, but also to
intelligently discuss the subject with tribal .leaders, mid-level host
nation governmental leaders, counterpart military officers from
coalition forces, and representatives from non-governmental and
international organizations. These officers would have the option to
get assistance from their Judge Advocates if the sophistication of the
discussion exceeded their comfort level, but at least they can
demonstrate and articulate a sensibility of the. subject.
Finally, general officers, public affairs officers and civil affairs
officers could be placed in Level III, which would require a more
sophisticated understanding and ability to discuss the subject than the
officers in Level II. These officers would likely have to discuss the
subject with high-ranking members of the host nation government,
coalition forces, international and non-governmental organizations,
and perhaps most importantly, members of the press. A great deal of
benefit in the area of public diplomacy can be reaped from a highly
visible image of a high-ranking U.S. military officer who can
convincingly explain why the U.S. military is taking actions that are
consistent with the law of war and not contrary to mainstream
Islamic teachings. Care would be taken so that U.S. military
personnel would not attempt to give the appearance of seeming to
think that they are experts or even qualified to speak authoritatively
on matters concerning Islam. The goal would be to merely display an
appropriate degree of understanding and sensitivity to these issues.
C. WHEN AND WHERE WOULD THE EDUCATION OCCUR
AND How WOULD IT TAKE PLACE?
The education for the Level I students could take place
simultaneously with the currently mandated law of war program. The
additional instruction would require only a minimal amount of extra
time and effort for the Judge Advocates to modify their instruction.
Level II instruction should take place throughout an officer's formal
education. Beginning with academy and ROTC programs, through
Officer Basic and Advance courses, and into Command and General
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Staff College and the War Colleges, this is a subject that warrants
repeated emphasis and focus. The law of war is already a part of the
curriculum for officers at each level of their normal military
professional education. The proposal is merely that this additional
perspective be incorporated into the existing program of instruction.
Finally, for Level II and III students, specialized programs and
teaching materials, in the form of short pamphlets, videotapes,
interactive CDs and other flexible teaching tools, could be used to
tailor the education as necessary. To be successful, the program must
provide recurring instruction to the students; a one-time class will not
have the desired effect.
V. VIABILITY AND COSTS OF
THE NEW PROGRAM
This program would be both viable and cost-effective. The
principal argument in support of this conclusion is the fact that a
DoD law of war training program already exists. This essay is merely
recommending a modification to the existing program. All of the
necessary parts are already in place. Incremental costs would be
negligible as the remaining real costs would be the initial
development of the curriculum, periodic updates to the curriculum,
and the production of pamphlets, CDs, videotapes and other teaching
materials which represent minor expenses. The Judge Advocates of
each service, working together and individually, could develop and
begin implementation of the new curriculum within six months, even
with a small budget and a small team of experts devoted to the task.
The few additional hours of training that this program would
require could be shifted from already budgeted training time on the
training schedules. In any event, even if a particular service decides
to merely add this instruction to existing instruction without cutting
out some other training, the expected benefits derived from this
instruction would make the extra few hours well worth the
investment.
CONCLUSION
It goes without saying that U.S. soldiers must obey the law of war
in combat. However, U.S. soldiers and their leaders should also
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understand how the multiple players within the Islamic world
conceive of and implement the law of war or try to use the law to
justify illegal tactics. This knowledge will help them better cooperate
with Muslim military partners and NGOs, communicate with the
media and defeat Muslim opponents. Dire consequences may result
when soldiers do not fully understand the interplay between the law
of war and cultural and religious beliefs.8 9
While the educational institutions and basic structures necessary to
implement this new training already exist, a new curriculum is
needed. The costs for implementing this program would be low. The
time necessary to develop and field the new program would be short.
Each military service could develop and implement programs that
would help their people base decisions on accurate facts and not false
assumptions about Islam and the law of war.
U.S. military planners should understand the limitations on
operations emanating from the law of war, as understood by their
Islamic coalition partners, to ensure smooth combined operations.
U.S. commanders with responsibility for the operations of Islamic
military units may bear responsibility under the law of war for the
actions of those units. Further, if U.S. commanders are not sensitive
to Islamic views concerning the law of war, Muslim populations may
perceive U.S. military action as violating Islamic tenants when
alternative, non-offensive, but equally adequate courses of action
could have been taken. Finally, Islamic enemies, state and non-state,
have studied the U.S. military's application of the law of war and
accordingly developed strategies to exploit perceived weaknesses
from our adherence to the law. The U.S. military should turn the
tables and study our enemies' failure to adhere to the law and exploit
that weakness on a global public relations battleground. No better
spokesman exists than a well-informed, articulate U.S. soldier who
can demonstrate an intelligent understanding of the relationship
89. See U.S. Soldiers Reprimanded for Burning Bodies, CNN, Nov. 26, 2005,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/ 11/26/afghan.us.soldiers/
(reporting that four U.S. soldiers stationed in Afghanistan were reprimanded for
burning the bodies of two Islamic fighters). Broadcast on Australian television, the
soldiers taunted Taliban fighters, urging them to come and retrieve the dead
bodies. Id. While burning bodies may be permissible under the Geneva
Conventions for hygienic purposes, the Muslim faith forbids burning bodies. Id.
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between the law of war and Islam to Muslim citizens and the
international media.
